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66 
Justice Scalia’s Unparalleled 
Contributions to Administrative Law 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
†
 
Justice Antonin Scalia contributed more to the 
development of administrative law than any other Justice in 
history. His contributions began long before his three decades 
of service on the Supreme Court. He was Chairman of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States—the 
government think tank that conducts studies of the 
administrative process and recommends best practices to 
agencies, Congress, and reviewing courts. He taught 
administrative law at University of Chicago and University of 
Virginia, where he made path-breaking contributions to 
administrative law scholarship. Before he was elevated to the 
Supreme Court, he served as a member of the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit—the court that decides far 
more administrative law cases than any other. 
Justice Scalia wrote scores of opinions on myriad issues of 
administrative law during his tenure on the Supreme Court. 
His opinions were shaped by two dominant values: skepticism 
about the legitimacy of judicial activism in a constitutional 
democracy and a strong aversion to ambiguity. Toward the end 
of his years on the Court, however, his opinions began to reflect 
a growing concern about the power of the executive branch of 
government. That concern seemed to give him pause that his 
longstanding skepticism about the effects of judicial activism 
might have led him to become too deferential to agencies. 
I. STANDING TO REVIEW AGENCY ACTIONS 
Justice Scalia authored many opinions in which he relied 
on the Constitution as the basis for a decision that denied 
 
†
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standing to a private citizen to obtain judicial review of an 
agency action or to obtain judicial enforcement of an agency-
administered statute against someone who allegedly violated 
that statute.
1
 Justice Scalia often invoked the Case or 
Controversy Clause of Article III as one of the bases for a 
decision that denied standing.
2
 Like many of his colleagues, 
Justice Scalia believed that a “Case or Controversy” within the 
jurisdiction of the Court can arise only as a result of a discrete 
agency action that uniquely injures an individual. He believed 
that a broad agency action that arguably causes injuries that 
are “shared by the many” is not within the Court’s power to 
resolve and redress.
3
 
Justice Scalia based many of his constitutional standing 
decisions on a theory that he described initially in an article he 
published in 1983 in Suffolk Law Review.
4
 In Justice Scalia’s 
view, the prohibition on standing based on injuries “shared by 
the many” prohibits courts from enforcing the public laws that 
Congress has entrusted executive branch agencies to enforce. 
Any judicial enforcement of such laws at the behest of members 
of the public who were among the intended beneficiaries of the 
laws would encroach upon the powers that the Vesting Clause 
and the Take Care Clause of Article II confer exclusively on the 
President.
5
 After explaining his theory in the article that he 
wrote just before he joined the Court,
6
 Justice Scalia introduced 
it to his colleagues in his 1988 dissenting opinion in Morrison v. 
Olson.
7
 Over time, he may have persuaded as many as six of his 
colleagues to embrace his theory.
8
 
Justice Scalia believed that only the politically accountable 
branches of government have the power to enforce laws, such 
as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, that are 
 
 1. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
 2. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–106; Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
at 559–63. 
 3. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 32–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of 
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
 6. Scalia, supra note 4. 
 7. 487 U.S. 654, 705–716, 724–28 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 8. Four Justices explicitly embraced the theory in the plurality opinion 
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, but it is impossible to know whether the two 
concurring Justices accepted the theory. 504 U.S. at 579–81. 
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intended to benefit the general public. If members of the public 
believe that an agency should be more aggressive in 
implementing and enforcing a public law, they should take 
their complaint to the agency or to the politically accountable 
President for redress. In Justice Scalia’s view, the Vesting 
Clause and the Take Care Clause confer the power to 
implement and enforce public laws uniquely on the President 
and his agents. Consistent with that view, Justice Scalia 
believed that an agency with the power to implement and 
enforce a public law must be headed by a presidential 
appointee who can be removed by the President at will.
9
 
Justice Scalia believed that the only remedies for the 
failure of an agency to enforce a public law sufficiently lay in 
the politically accountable branches of government.
10
 If 
members of the public believe that an agency should be more 
aggressive in implementing and enforcing a public law, they 
should take their complaint to the agency. If the agency refuses 
to act in accordance with their views, they should take their 
complaint to the President. If the President agrees with the 
complaining party, he can remove the agency head from office 
and replace him with someone who is prepared to engage in 
more aggressive enforcement actions. If the President declines 
to act in ways that satisfy the complaining members of the 
public, their sole recourse lies at the ballot box. They should not 
be allowed to circumvent the political process by seeking 
redress from politically unaccountable judges. 
Similarly, Justice Scalia felt that if an agency is unable to 
enforce a public law as aggressively as some members of the 
public prefer because of inadequate congressional funding, they 
should take their complaint to Congress. If Congress agrees 
with them, it will increase the agency’s appropriations. If not, 
the sole recourse of the complaining members of the public is at 
the ballot box. They should not be allowed to circumvent the 
political process by taking their complaint to the politically 
unaccountable judiciary. 
II. JUSTICIABILITY AND THE POWER TO REMOVE AN 
AGENCY HEAD 
Justice Scalia’s opinions on justiciability and the removal 
power followed logically from the political and constitutional 
 
 9. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705–16, 724–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10. Scalia, supra note 4. 
  
2016] UNPARALLELED CONTRIBUTIONS 69 
 
theory of government that was the basis for his standing 
jurisprudence. Thus, for instance, he consistently expressed the 
view that the President must have the power to remove any 
agency head at will.
11
 To Justice Scalia, that power is required 
by the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause. The 
President cannot be expected to be able to implement the 
“executive power” or to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed” unless he has the plenary power to remove an officer 
who, in the President’s opinion, is not faithfully executing the 
laws. 
Similarly, Justice Scalia authored opinions in which he 
concluded that courts can review only “discrete agency actions” 
and cannot consider broad attacks on the manner in which 
agencies are implementing statutorily authorized programs.
12
 
Any broad complaints about agency practices must be lodged 
exclusively with the politically accountable President or the 
politically accountable Congress. If those politically accountable 
institutions fail to act effectively in response to those 
complaints, the complaining members of the public have 
recourse to the ballot box to redress their grievances. They 
should not be able to avoid the political process by seeking 
relief from politically unaccountable judges. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS 
Justice Scalia’s views on the proper role of courts when 
they review agency actions fit well with his views on standing 
to obtain review, justiciability, and the removal power. Justice 
Scalia was the most consistent proponent of the approach to 
judicial review that the Court announced in its 1984 opinion in 
Chevron v. NRDC: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of a statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter. If, however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, 
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
 
 11. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705–16, 724–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004); Lujan 
v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890–92 (1990). 
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the question is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.
13
 
The Court based the Chevron test in part on constitutional 
and political grounds. The Court distinguished between issues 
of law that a court can resolve by interpreting a statute and 
issues of policy that should be resolved by the politically 
accountable executive branch rather than the politically 
unaccountable judicial branch when Congress has declined to 
resolve the issue by statute. In the Court’s words: 
Judges . . . are not part of either political branch of the 
Government. . . . In contrast, an agency to which Congress has 
delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that 
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views 
of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such 
policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress 
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute 
in light of everyday realities. 
 When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the 
agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a 
gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, 
federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities 
for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the 
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not 
judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the 
political branches.”
14
 
The political and constitutional underpinnings of Chevron 
are identical to the theory of government that is the basis for 
Justice Scalia’s decisions on standing, justiciability and the 
removal power. If members of the public dislike an agency’s 
policy decision, their recourse is to the agency, the President 
and ultimately to the ballot box. Politically unaccountable 
judges should not be permitted to circumvent that political 
process by resolving the policy dispute themselves. 
Justice Scalia was not a member of the Court when it 
decided Chevron but he embraced the Chevron doctrine 
immediately after he arrived. In a 1987 opinion, a majority of 
Justices appeared to adopt an interpretation of the Chevron 
doctrine that Justice Scalia considered to be a de facto 
 
 13. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 14. Id. at 865–66 (citation omitted). 
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weakening of the doctrine.
15
 He wrote a separate concurring 
opinion in which he criticized the majority’s apparent 
weakening of Chevron and engaged in a vigorous defense of the 
original Chevron doctrine.
16
 He provided a comprehensive 
explanation of the reasons for his support for the doctrine and 
of its basis in political and constitutional theory in a 1989 
article he published in Duke Law Journal.
17
 He continued to 
support and apply the doctrine during his entire tenure on the 
Court, often in opinions in which he defended it from attacks by 
other Justices.
18
 His support for the doctrine reached its apogee 
in a 2013 opinion in which he held that courts must confer 
Chevron deference even on agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutory provisions that are intended to limit an agency’s 
jurisdiction.
19
 
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA’S AVERSION TO AMBIGUITY 
Justice Scalia’s consistent support for the highly 
deferential Chevron doctrine seems at first to be a poor fit with 
empirical studies of Justice Scalia’s patterns of decisions in 
administrative law cases. Justice Scalia voted to uphold agency 
actions less frequently than any other Justice.
20
 How can a 
Justice who criticizes judicial activism and extols the virtues of 
judicial deference to agency policy decisions vote with such 
great frequency to reject agency interpretations of agency 
statutes? 
 
 15. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 16. Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 17. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 513–17 (1989). 
 18. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–26 (2002) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245–50 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588–97 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In National Cable & Telecommunications Association 
v. Brand X Internet Services, a majority of Justices held that a judicial decision 
that upholds an agency interpretation of an agency-administered statute does 
not qualify as stare decisis unless the court concludes that the agency 
interpretation was the only permissible interpretation of the statute. 545 U.S. 
967, 982–83 (2005). Many scholars believed that the holding in Brand X 
followed logically from the reasoning in Chevron. See, e.g., RICHARD PIERCE, I 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 182–83 (5th ed. 2010). Justice Scalia 
dissented, however, based on his belief that the Brand X opinion was another 
attack on Chevron. 545 U.S. at 1005–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 19. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 20. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1154 tbl.20 (2008). 
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Justice Scalia explained that apparent inconsistency 
between his beliefs and his actions by referring to the other 
core value that motivated him throughout his career. He had a 
powerful aversion to ambiguity and rarely saw ambiguity in 
the text of statutes. He made that point explicitly in his 1989 
article in Duke Law Journal.
21
 After explaining why the 
deferential Chevron doctrine was required by his theory of 
government, he predicted that he would rarely invoke it as the 
basis to uphold an agency interpretation of an ambiguous 
provision of a statute.
22
 Since Chevron requires a reviewing 
court to defer to an agency interpretation only when the court 
concludes that the statutory provision is ambiguous, Justice 
Scalia predicted accurately that he would rarely defer to an 
agency interpretation of a statute under Chevron because he 
rarely sees ambiguities in statutory texts. 
Many of the opinions in which Justice Scalia defended 
Chevron from attack by other Justices can be explained in part 
by his powerful aversion to ambiguity. When the Court 
announced the Chevron test in 1984, many people, including 
Justice Scalia, believed that it replaced the test that the Court 
had announced in its 1944 opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.: 
The weight [accorded to an agency judgment] in a particular case will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier, and later, 
pronouncements, and all those factors that give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.
23
 
The multi-factor Skidmore test has often been criticized as 
ambiguous and unpredictable in the results of its application.
24
 
From 2000 to 2002, a majority of Justices joined opinions 
in which they announced for the first time that the Skidmore 
test survived the announcement of the Chevron test.
25
 They 
then instructed courts to apply Chevron in some circumstances 
and to apply Skidmore in other circumstances.
26
 Their 
description of the circumstances in which a court should apply 
Skidmore rather than Chevron was not a model of clarity. Not 
surprisingly, Justice Scalia disagreed.
27
 He disliked the 
 
 21. Scalia, supra note 17. 
 22. Id. at 521. 
 23. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 24. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 18, at 155–57, 166–71. 
 25. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–26 (2002) (Scalia, J., 
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Skidmore test because of its ambiguity, and he particularly 
disliked the new legal regime the majority had created in the 
period from 2000 to 2002 because of the added ambiguity about 
which test a court is required to apply in various 
circumstances. 
V. RECENT CONCERN ABOUT AGENCY ABUSE OF 
POWER 
Over the last three years of his tenure, Justice Scalia 
began to write opinions that suggested that he was increasingly 
concerned about potential abuse of agency power and that he 
had become uneasy about the unintended effects of the judicial 
deference doctrines that he helped to create. In one of his last 
opinions he urged the Court to overrule a deference doctrine 
that is similar to the Chevron doctrine except that it applies to 
agency interpretations of ambiguous rules rather than 
ambiguous statutes.
28
 He also engaged in a harsh critique of all 
deference doctrines, including Chevron: 
The [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] was framed against a 
background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a 
check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried 
them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices. 
. . . The Act thus contemplates that courts, not agencies, will 
authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations. . . . 
Heedless of the original design of the APA, we have developed an 
elaborate law of deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes and 
regulations. Never mentioning [the APA’s] directive that the 
“reviewing court . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions,” we have held 
that agencies may authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes.
29
 
CONCLUSION 
We will never know how Justice Scalia would have 
resolved the apparent tension between the deference doctrines 
he helped to create and defend for decades and his new-found 
concern about the dangers posed by agencies that have a 
tendency to overstep the relatively loose boundaries created by 
those deference doctrines. In any event, we owe him a debt of 
 
concurring); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245–50 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588–97 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 29. Id. at 1211–13 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 842–43) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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gratitude for devoting his life to an attempt to create and to 
implement a coherent theory of administrative law to fit a 
constitutional democracy. 
